Motivated by the quest for scalable and succinct zero knowledge arguments, we revisit worstcase-to-average-case reductions for linear spaces, raised by [Rothblum, Vadhan, Wigderson, STOC 2013]. The previous state of the art by [Ben-Sasson, Kopparty, Saraf, CCC 2018] showed that if some member of an affine space U is δ-far in relative Hamming distance from a linear code V -this is the worst-case assumption -then most elements of U are almost-δ-far from V -this is the average case. However, this result was known to hold only below the "double Johnson" function of the relative distance δ V of the code V , i.e., only when δ < 1 − (1 − δ V ) 1/4 . First, we increase the soundness-bound to the "one-and-a-half Johnson" function of δ V and show that the average distance of U from V is nearly δ for any worst-case distance δ smaller than 1
is max(δ, δ 0 ) then to reach soundness error less than 2 −λ for codes of blocklength n, communication complexity (and verifier complexity) scale roughly like λ log δ 0 · c · log n for some constant c. Thus, the improvement from Equation (1) to Equation (2) translates to a 25% reduction in verifier complexity (from 4λ log ρ · c · log n to 3λ log ρ · c · log n). To break the soundness bound of Equation (2) and thereby further reduce verifier complexity in the afore-mentioned systems, we suggest a new method. We discuss it first for RS codes, then generalize to arbitrary linear codes. If u * , u : D → F are indeed the evaluation of two degree d polynomials, say, P * and P , our verifier will artificially extend the domain D to a larger oneD, sample uniformly z ∈D and ask for the evaluation of P * (z) and P (z). The answers provided by the prover can now be applied to modify each of u * and u in a local manner to reflect the new knowledge, and along the way also prune down the large list of polynomials which u * and u might pretend to be. If α * z = P * (z), α z = P (z) are the honest prover's answers to the query z, then (X − z) divides P * (X) − α * z and likewise (X − z)|P (X) − α z . Letting α x = α * + xα and P x (X) = P * (X) + xP (X) it follows that (X − z)|P x (X) − α x . Consider now the soundness of this procedure. In the extreme case that u * has a small list of polynomials that, each, somewhat agree with it, then with high probability over z, any answer provided by the prover will agree with at most one of the polynomials in this list. The proof of our main technical result, Theorem 4.1, formalizes this intuition. For radius δ, let L * δ be the maximal list size,
where ∆ denotes relative Hamming distance. Let V | ux(z)=αx be the restriction of V to codewords that are evaluations of polynomials of degree at most d that, additionally, evaluate to α x on z.
Our main Theorem 4.1 shows that if ∆(u * , V ) = δ max then for any pair of answers α * z , α z given in response to query z,
The Johnson bound (Theorem 2.2) says that when δ < J(1 − ρ) = 1 − √ ρ we have L * δ = O(1) and this improves the worst-case-to-average-case result from that of Equation (2) to a bound that matches the Johnson bound:
The exact behavior of the list size of Reed-Solomon codes beyond the Johnson bound is a famous open problem. It may be the case that the list size is small for radii far greater than the Johnson bound; in fact, for most domains D this is roughly known to hold [RW14] . If it holds that that list sizes are small all the way up to radius equal to the distance δ V = 1 − ρ (i.e., if Reed-Solomon codes meet list-decoding capacity), then Equation (5) implies that the technique suggested here has optimal soundness for (nearly) all distance parameters.
Generalization to arbitrary linear codes The DEEP method can be used to improve worstto-average-case reductions for general linear codes. Viewing codewords in V as evaluations of linear forms of a domain D, we ask for the evaluation of the linear forms that supposedly correspond to u * and u on a random location z ∈D where |D| ≫ |D|. Lemma 4.6 generalizes Theorem 4.1 and says that if V has near-capacity list-decoding radius (with small list size) andD corresponds to (columns of a generating matrix of) a good error correcting code, then we have E x [δ x ] ≈ δ max .
The main difference between the RS case and that of general linear codes is that in the former, the prover-answers α * (x), α(x) can be processed to modify locally the entries of u x to reduce the degree of the resulting function; this is something we cannot carry out (to best of our understanding) for all linear codes.
DEEP-FRI
Applying the technique of domain extension for eliminating pretenders to the FRI protocol requires a modification that we discuss next. The FRI protocol can be described as a process of "randomly folding" an (inverse) Fast Fourier Transform (iFFT) computation. In the "classical" iFFT, one starts with a function f (0) : ω → F where ω generates a multiplicative group of order 2 k for integer k. The iFFT computes (in arithmetic complexity O(k2 k )) the interpolating polynomial f (X) of the function f . This computation follows by computing (in linear time) a pair of functions f 0 , f 1 : ω 2 → F, recalling | ω 2 | = 1 2 | ω |. Their interpolantsf 0 ,f 1 are then used to compute in linear time the original interpolantf of f .
As explained in [BBHR18b] , in the FRI protocol the prover first commits to f as above. Then the verifier samples a random x (0) ∈ F and the protocol continues with the single function f (1) : ω 2 → F which is supposedly f (1) := f 0 + x (0) f 1 . It turns out that if f is indeed of degree less than ρ| ω | then for all x we have that f (1) is of degree less than ρ| ω 2 | as well. The tricky part is showing that when f is δ-far from RS[F, ω , ρ] this also holds with high probability (over x) for f (1) and some δ ′ that is as close as possible to δ. (One can show that invariably we have δ ′ ≤ δ, i.e., the green line of Figure 1 is an upper bound on soundness of both FRI and the new DEEP-FRI protocol described below.)
The worst-case-to-average-case results of Equation (2) and Lemma 3.1 can be converted to similar improvements for FRI, showing that for δ < 1 − 3 √ ρ we have δ ′ ≈ δ. This follows directly from the techniques of [BKS18a, Section 7] (see the red line in Figure 1 ). But to use the new DEEP technique of Equation (4) and Theorem 4.1 in order to improve soundness of an RS-IOPP, we need to modify the FRI protocol, leading to a new protocol that is aptly called DEEP-FRI. Instead of constructing f (1) directly, our verifier first samples z (0) ∈ F and queries the prover for the evaluation of the interpolant of f (0) on z (0) and −z (0) . After the answers α z (i) , α −z (i) have been recorded, the verifier proceeds by sampling x (0) and expects the prover to submit f (1) which is the linear combination of f ′ 0 , f ′ 1 derived from the modification f ′ of f that takes into account the answers α z (i) , α −z (i) . Assumingf is the interpolant of f , an honest prover would set f ′ (X) := (f (X) − U (X))/(Z(X)) where U (X) is the degree ≤ 1 polynomial that evaluates to α z (0) on z (0) and to α −z (0) on −z (0) and Z(X) is the monic degree 2 polynomial whose roots are z (0) and −z (0) . As shown in Section 5, the soundness bounds of Equation (4) and Theorem 4.1 now apply to DEEP-FRI. This shows that the soundness of DEEP-FRI, i.e., the rejection probability of words that are δ-far from RS[F, D, ρ]) is roughly δ for any δ that is smaller than the maximal radius for which list-sizes are "small". Figure 1 summarizes the results described here.
DEEP Algebraic Linking IOP (DEEP-ALI)
In Section 1.3 we only discussed results improving the soundness of Reed-Solomon Proximity Testing (RPT). We now discuss how to improve the soundness of IOP-based argument systems (such as [BBHR18a, BCR + 18]) that use RPT solutions. In order to reap the benefits of the improved FRI initial lower bound [BBHR18b] Figure 1: FRI and DEEP-FRI soundness threshold δ 0 as a function of RS code rate ρ, for a single invocation of the QUERY phase, as field size q → ∞. δ 0 (ρ) is defined to be the largest distance parameter δ for which soundness (rejection probaiblity) of a single invocation of the FRI/DEEP-FRI QUERY is δ − o(1). Higher lines are better. The top line is the trivial upper bound on soundness which applies to both FRI and DEEP-FRI; the bottom line is the soundness of the original analysis of [BBHR18b] . Dashed lines represent prior results. The red line is the (tight) soundness lower bound for FRI and the blue line is a lower bound on DEEP-FRI soundness. Under a plausible conjecture for Reed-Solomon list-decodability (Conjecture 2.3), the actual soundness is as high as the green line.
soundness of RPT, we need reductions that produce instances of the RPT problem that are very far from the relevant RS code when the input instance is unsatisfiable. One such protocol is the Algebraic Linking IOP (ALI) of [BBHR18a] . The instances of the RPT problem derived from an unsatisfiable instance in ALI are proven to be somewhat far from low-degree but the distance bound proved in that paper is less than 1/8, even when used with RS codes of negligible rate ρ (nevertheless it is conjectured and assumed in both ZK-STARK [BBHR18a] and Aurora [BCR + 18] that the distance is significantly greater). In Section 6 we use the DEEP technique to modify the ALI protocol in a manner similar to the DEEP-FRI modification. The result of this modification allows us to apply the soundness results of Equation (4) to the DEEP-ALI protocol and show that, when provided with unsatisfiable instances, the distance of the received words that result from that protocol is provably at least 1 − √ ρ − o(1) (and may be greater, assuming more favourable bounds on the list decoding radius for RS codes, as in Conjecture 2.3).
Organization of the rest of the paper Section 2 presents general notation. Section 3 gives an improved worst-to-average case reductions for general spaces and shows that the bound in the reduction is tight (Lemma 3.3). Section 4 presents our main technical result, showing that the DEEP method improves worst-to-average case reductions for RS codes up to the Johnson bound (provably) and perhaps even beyond. Section 5 presents the DEEP-FRI protocol that obtains better soundness than the state of the art FRI protocol, and Section 6 discusses the DEEP-ALI protocol.
Preliminaries
Functions For a set D, we will be working with the space of functions u :
For u ∈ F D we use u(z) to denote the zth entry of u, for z ∈ D. For C ⊂ D we use f | C to denote the restriction of f to C. For two functions f, g : D → F we write f = g when the two functions are equal as elements in F D and similarly say f | C = g| C when their restrictions are equal as elements in F C . 
Polynomials and RS codes The interpolant of f : D → F q is the unique polynomial of degree < |D| whose evaluation on D is f . The degree of f , denoted deg(f ), is the degree of its interpolant. The RS code evaluated over domain D ⊂ F and rate ρ is denoted
Sometimes it will be more convenient to work with degree rather than rate, in which case we abuse notation and define
We use capital letters like P, Q to denote polynomials and when we say P ∈ RS[F, D, ρ] we mean that deg(P ) < ρ|D| and associate P with the RS codeword that is its evaluation on D. We also usef to denote the interpolant of a function f . 
List Decoding
We recall the fundamental Johnson bound, which says that sets with large minimum distance have nontrivial list-decodability. The particular version below follows, e.g., from [Gur07, Theorem 
In particular, for Reed-Solomon codes this implies the following list-decodability bound:
Extremely optimistically, we could hope that Reed-Solomon codes are list-decodable all the way up to their distance with moderate list sizes. Staying consistent with the known limitations [BSKR10] , we have the following brave conjecture. 
3 Improved High-error Distance Preservation
Our first result gives better distance preservation results for linear codes V of relative distance λ. The previous state-of-the-art [BKS18a] said that when a 1-dimensional affine space U contains some element u * that is δ max = ∆(u * , V ) far from V , then
The following lemma improves the average-case distance to
Later on, in Section 3.1, we will show that this result is tight (for a sub-family of RS codes).
Lemma 3.1 (One-and-half Johnson distance preservation). Let V ⊆ F n q be a linear code of distance λ = ∆(V ). Let ǫ, δ > 0 with ǫ < 1/3 and δ < 1
This result is the contra-positive statement of the following, more informative, version of it, that we prove below. 
Then there exist v, v * ∈ V and C ⊆ D such that the following three statements hold simultaneously:
• u| C = v| C , and
Observe that if u, u * satisfy Equation (6) then the v, v * , C deduced by Lemma 3.2 have the property that for all x ∈ F q , we have ∆(u * + xu, V ) ≤ δ + ǫ. In other words, the existence of v, v * and C almost completely explains Equation (6).
Quantitatively weaker statements in this vein were proved by [PS94, BBHR18b] in the lowerror case, and [CMS17, BKS18a] in the high-error case. The proofs of the latter two results used combinatorial tools (the Kovary-Sos-Turan bound and the Johnson bound respectively) that are closely related to one another. Our improved proof below is direct, and is based on the same convexity principle that underlies both the Kovary-Sos-Turan and Johnson bounds.
For each x ∈ A, let v x ∈ V be an element of V that is closest to u x , and let S x ⊆ D be the agreement set of u x and v x , defined as S x = {y ∈ D | u x (y) = v x (y)}. For x, β, γ picked uniformly from A and y picked uniformly from D, we have:
The second equality above follows from the independence of the events y ∈ S x , y ∈ S β , y ∈ S γ given y ∈ D. The first inequality is Jensen's and the last inequality is by assumption on δ, γ, ǫ.
Thus Pr
Note that Pr x,β,γ [x, β, γ are not all distinct] < 3/|A|. Since |A| ≥ 2/ǫ 2 > 6 ǫ , we have that 3/|A| ≤ ǫ/2 and hence x, β, γ are all distinct with probability at least 1−ǫ/2. Thus with probability at least ǫ/2 over the choice of x, β, γ, we have that x, β, γ are all distinct and
This means that there are distinct x 0 , β 0 such that
Fix a γ where this happens.
are all collinear. By definition of S, we get that:
are all collinear. Since |S| > (1 − λ)|D| (and recalling that λ is the distance of V ), we get that v γ is determined by v γ | S via a linear map. This means that
are all collinear. Thus ǫ/2-fraction of the γ ∈ A have the "good" property that (γ, v γ ) is on the line passing through (x 0 , v x 0 ) and (β 0 , v β 0 ). Write this line as v * + xv and notice that for all "good" γ we have v γ = v * + γv. Let A ′ ⊆ A denote the set of good elements for this line, recording that
For each y ∈ D \ C there exists at most a single value of x ∈ F q satisfying u
has at most one value x on which it vanishes. This implies
Rearranging, we get |C| |D| ≥ 1 − (δ + ǫ) and this completes the proof.
Tightness of the one-and-a-half Johnson bound
Lemma 3.1 says that when V is a linear code with minimum distance λ, and u * is some element that is δ-far from V , then for any u we have with high probability
The rightmost term seems quite strange, as the J (1.5) (·) function is unfamiliar in other settings of coding theory. However, as we show next, in certain settings this function gives the correct bound!
Lemma 3.3 (Tightness of one-and-a-half Johnson bound). For every member V n of following family of RS codes
2 n satisfying the following:
We shall need to following claim in our proof of the lemma.
that has 2 n−1 distinct roots in F 2 n .
Proof. For x = 0 let β x = 1/x 2 , noticing β x is unique because the map β → β 2 is bijective on F 2 n . Let Tr(Z)
n−1 i=0 Z 2 i be the trace function from F 2 n to F 2 . Define
It is well known that |S x | = 2 n−1 because the trace function has 2 n−1 roots in F 2 n . So we define
The last equality follows because β 2 n−2
Proof of Lemma 3.3. Consider V n in this family and let F = F 2 n . Define u * : F → F to be the function u * (y) = y 2 n−1 and let u : F → F be the function u(y) = y 2 n−2 . By Claim 3.4, for every x ∈ F \ {0} there is some v x ∈ V n and P x with 2 n−1 roots in F such that
Thus we get that for all x ∈ F \ {0}
On the other hand, ∆(u, V ) ≥ 3/4, because for all v ∈ V n , u − v is a polynomial of degree at most 2 n−2 = |F|/4. This completes the proof.
Remark 3.5. Since this example is based on Reed-Solomon codes, it also easily translates into a limitation on the soundness of FRI. In particular, it means that the improvment to the soundness of FRI given in Remark 5.2 is optimal.
Discussion Lemma 3.3 raises the question of whether the one-and-a-half Johnson bound of Lemma 3.1 is tight for all RS codes, including non-binary fields and evaluation domains that are strict subsets of the ambient field. We point out that the technique used to prove Lemma 3.3 deteriorates rapidly even for binary fields, and even when the evaluation domain is an F 2 -linear space which resembles the case above. Indeed, consider an evaluation domain D ⊂ F 2 n that is a d + 1-dimensional linear space over
which resembles the structure of Claim 3.4. Moreover, as was the case there, for
As in Lemma 3.3, taking u * to be the evaluation of Y 2 d on D and u be the evaluation of Y 2 d−1 on the same space, we conclude there exists a set A ⊂ F, |A| = 2 d , such that for x ∈ A we have that u * + xu agrees with some RS codeword of rate 2 −3 on half of the evaluation domain.
However, notice that |A|/2 n = 2 −(n−d) , meaning that the probability of sampling x ∈ A deteriorates exponentially with the difference n − d. Thus the above counterexample fails to rule out an improvement to Lemma 3.1 when the length of the code n is much smaller than the size of the field q.
Conceivably, both Lemma 3.1 and the analysis of FRI can be improved significantly under the assumption n ≪ q. This is the case of most importance to practical implementations of STARKs.
The DEEP Theorem -Using Domain Extension for Eliminating Pretenders (DEEP) and Improving Soundness
We now come to the statement of our improved-soundness distance preservation result. We describe it first for the special case of RS codes. A weighted variant of the theorem is shown in Section 4.2 because it is used later in the DEEP-FRI protocol (Section 5). We end with Section 4.3 in which we present a general version of the folowing result, that applies to all linear codes.
DEEP Theorem for RS codes
The vectors u * , u discussed in the previous section are now viewed as functions u * , u : D → F q and we are interested in the distance of a random linear combination
, where x ∈ F q is sampled uniformly. Lemma 3.1 established that if max(∆(u * , V ), ∆(u, V )) = δ max , then with high probability (over x), the function u x will have distance at least ≈ min(δ max , 1 − ρ 1/3 ) from V . Lemma 3.2 roughly gets used in the following way in the FRI protocol. There are two functions u * , u : D → F q and there is a prover who claims that both are evaluations of low degree polynomials. In order to verify this, the verifier uniformly samples x ∈ F q and considers the function u x = u * +x·u. Lemma 3.2 shows that if any of u * , u is far from being evaluations of a low degree polynomial, then so is u * + x · u. This then gets exploited in the FRI protocol using FFT type ideas.
We now precede the random process of sampling x ∈ F q with a step of domain extension, explained next. Assume a prover claims that both u and u * are evaluations of low degree polynomials (say P (Y ) and P * (Y )). So these polynomials can be evaluated also outside of D. Based on this, a verifier first samples z ∈ F q uniformly and asks the prover to reply with two field elements a * , a ∈ F q which are supposedly equal to P * (z), P (z), respectively. After receiving these answers, the verifier proceeds as before, sampling uniformly x ∈ F q . Then, setting b = a * +x·a, we examine the distance of u x from the sub-code V z,b ⊂ V comprised of all members of V whose interpolating polynomial evaluates to b on input z. The code V z,b is the additive coset (shifted by b) of a low-degree ideal, the ideal generated by (X − z) (cf. Lemma 5.3).
Using the Johnson Bound (Theorem 2.2) we prove that with high probability u x is at least ≈ min(δ max , 1 − ρ 1/2 ) far from V z,b . Assuming RS codes have a larger list-decoding radius (Conjec-ture 2.3), we show that with high probability u x is ≈ δ max -far from V z,b for nearly all values of δ max . Later, in Section 5, we shall use the improved distance preservation to construct the DEEP-FRI protocol for testing proximity to the RS code with improved soundness.
The statement we give below is given more generally in terms of the list size bound L(F q , D, d = ρ|D|, δ); we instantiate it later with the Johnson bound and with Conjecture 2.3. It is useful to keep in mind that this will be used in a setting where q is much larger than |D| (and hence d), and where L * δ is small.
Theorem 4.1 (DEEP method for RS codes). Let ρ > 0 and let
be an arbitrary linear function. Suppose that for some 1/3 > ǫ > 0 the following holds,
Then there exist v, v * ∈ V and C ⊂ D such that:
Proof. To simplify notation set η = max 2L *
, and let u x = u * + xu.
The assumption of Equation (7) now reads as
Thus we get,
and notice |A| ≥ ηq/2. For x ∈ F q , pick P x ∈ V to be a member P ∈ List(u x , V, δ) that maximizes Pr
δ , and so by the pigeonhole principle, for each x ∈ A we have µ x ≥ η 2L * δ . For x, β, γ picked uniformly from A, and z picked uniformly from F q , we have:
The second equality above follows from the independence of x, β, γ. The first inequality is an application of Jensen's inequality and the last inequality is by assumption on η.
Consider some γ where this happens.
are collinear. So, in particular, for z ∈ S this holds. By definition of S, we get that for each z ∈ S,
are collinear. Since |S| > d, we have that P γ is uniquely determined by P γ | S by a linear map. This allows us to conclude that
Thus, an ǫ/2-fraction of the γ ∈ A have the "good" property that (γ, P γ ) is on the line passing through (x 0 , P x 0 ) and (β 0 , P β 0 ). Write this line as P * + xP and notice that for all "good" γ we have P γ = P * + γP . Let A ′ ⊆ A denote the set of good elements for this line, recording that |A ′ | ≥ |A| · ǫ/2 ≥ 1/ǫ. By definition of List(u x , V, δ) and the assumption P x ∈ List(u x , V, δ), we have that ∆(u x , P x ) < δ for x ∈ A ′ .
Consider the set C ⊂ D defined by
For each y ∈ D \C there exists at most a single value of x ∈ F q satisfying u x (y) = P x (y) because
Rearranging, we get |C| |D| ≥ 1 − (δ + ǫ). Taking v = P and v * = P * completes the proof. 
Weighted version
For application to Reed-Solomon Proximity Testing, it is more convenient to have a weighted version of the previous result. We briefly introduce some notation for dealing with weights, and then state the new version.
For a subspace V ⊆ F n q , we define
be an arbitrary linear function. Suppose that
The proof is nearly identical to the proof of Theorem 4.1 so we only highlight the changes. First, we observe that if η 1 : D → [0, 1] is the the constant function with value 1, then agree
The size of this latter set is bounded by L * , and thus the size of the former set is too. The proof then proceeds as before, until the very end, where we have a set A ′ ⊆ F q , with |A ′ | ≥ polynomials P, P * ∈ V such that for each x ∈ A ′ , agree η (u * + xu, P * + xP ) > α. Then we take C = {y ∈ C | u * (y) = P * (y), u(y) = P (y)}, and our goal is to show that y∈C η(y) > (α − ǫ)|D|.
To this end, consider:
This implies that y∈C η(y) > (α − ǫ)|D|, and the rest of the proof is the same as before. If we are given a function u : D → F q which is supposed to be the evaluations of a linear form ℓ on D, we can ask about what the evaluation of this linear form at a point z ∈ S is. This is the viewpoint from which the DEEP lemma generalizes to general codes.
DEEP Lemma for general linear codes
We start with two functions u, u * : D → F q (which are supposed to correspond to linear forms, say ℓ ∈ F k q and ℓ * ∈ F k q . We have a verifier who samples z ∈ S and asking for a = ℓ(z) and a * = ℓ * (z). Given these answers, the verifier now samples x ∈ F q and computes b = a * + xa which is supposedly equal to ℓ * (z) + ℓ(z) (if u * and u are indeed codewords of V ). The result below says that if S is the set of columns of an error correcting code with good distance, and V has small list size for list-decoding up to radius δ, then with high probability, the function u x = u * + xu has distance at least ≈ min{∆(u * , V ), δ} from the sub-code of V corresponding to the linear forms that evaluate to b on z. 
be an arbitrary linear function. Suppose that for some ǫ > 0 the following holds,
Then there exist v, v * ∈ V and C ⊂ [n] such that:
The proof is analogous to the proof in the Reed-Solomon case, and appears in Appendix A.
Discussion For the special case of RS codes, the DEEP method can be used to locally modify the problem and reduce degree. Indeed, the subcode V z,b in the case of RS codes corresponds is comprised of functions f : D → F that are evaluations of polynomials of degree d whose interpolating polynomial P f satisfies P f (z) = b. From such a codeword, one can construct a new codeword
, which is well-defined for all z ∈ D. Notice that the transformation from f to f z,b is 1-local, meaning that each entry of f z,b is constructed by making a single query to f . Furthermore, this transformation maps a subset of the code RS[F, D, d] to the code RS[F, D, d − 1], so we may use this transformation in RS IOPPs (as will done in the following section).
In contrast, for a general k-dimensional linear code V , the subcode V z,b , while being an affine subspace of V , has less structure. In particular, it is not clear how to locally convert this subcode to a "nice" code of dimension k − 1. An interesting middle ground, left to future work, is the case of algebraic codes like Reed Muller codes and Algebraic Geometry codes which resemble RS codes.
DEEP-FRI
In this section we describe the new fast RS IOPP, called DEEP-FRI. We start by recalling the FRI protocol from [BBHR18b] , describing it nearly verbatim as in [BKS18b, Section 7].
FRI
Our starting point is a function f (0) : L (0) → F where F is a finite field, the evaluation domain L (0) ⊂ F is a coset of a group 2 contained in F, and |L (0) | = 2 k (0) . We assume the target rate is ρ = 2 −R for some positive integer R. The FRI protocol is a two-phase protocol (the two phases are called COMMIT and QUERY) that convinces a verifier that f (0) is close to the Reed-Solomon code
The COMMIT phase of the FRI protocol involves r = k (0) −R rounds. Before any communication, the prover and verifier agree on a sequence of (cosets of) sub-groups L (i) , where
The main ingredient of the FRI protocol is a special algebraic hash function H x , which takes a seed x ∈ F, and given as input a function f : L (i) → F, it produces as output a hash whose length is 1/2 as long as f . More concretely, H x [f ] is a function
with the following properties:
(s) can be computed by querying f at just two points in its domain (these two points are (q (i) ) −1 (s)).
completeness: If f ∈ RS (i)
, then for all x ∈ F, we have that
3. soundness: If f is far from RS (i) , then with high probability over the choice of seed x, H x [f ] is quite far from RS (i+1) .
These last two properties roughly show that for random x, H x preserves distance to Reed-Solomon codes. For the precise description of H x see Appendix B and [BKS18a] . The high-level idea of the FRI protocol can then be described as follows. First we are in the COMMIT phase of the protocol. The verifier picks a random x (0) ∈ F and asks the prover to write down the hash H x (0) [f (0) ] : L (1) → F. By Properties 2 and 3 above, our original problem of estimating the distance of f (0) to RS (0) reduces to estimating the distance of
(which is a problem of 1/2 the size). This process is then repeated: the verifier picks a random x (1) ∈ F and asks the prover to write down
, and so on. After r rounds of this, we are reduced to a constant sized problem which can be solved in a trivial manner. However, the verifier cannot blindly trust that the functions f (1) , . . . that were written down by the prover truly are obtained by repeatedly hashing f (0) . This has to be checked, and the verifier does this in the QUERY phase of the protocol, using Property 1 above. We describe the phases of the protocol below.
COMMIT Phase:
1. For i = 0 to r − 1:
(a) The verifier picks uniformly random x (i) ∈ F and sends it to the prover.
(b) The prover writes down a function f (i+1) : L (i+1) → F. (In the case of an honest prover,
2. The prover writes down a value C ∈ F q . (In the case of an honest prover, f (r) is the constant function with value = C).
QUERY Phase: (executed by the Verifier)
1. Repeat ℓ times:
(a) Pick s (0) ∈ L (0) uniformly at random.
(b) For i = 0 to r − 1:
(c) If f (r) (s (r) ) = C, then REJECT.
ACCEPT
The previous state of the art regarding the soundness of FRI is given by the following statement from [BKS18a] . In what follows let J ǫ (x) = 1 − 1 − x(1 − ǫ).
Theorem 5.1 (FRI soundness (informal)). Suppose
Then for any ǫ > 0 there exists ǫ ′ > 0 so that with probability at least
over the randomness of the verifier during the COMMIT phase, and for any (adaptively chosen) prover oracles f (1) , . . . , f (r) , the QUERY protocol with repetition parameter ℓ outputs accept with probability at most
Remark 5.2. Using the improved distance preservation of Lemma 3.2 in the analysis of FRI from [BKS18a] , one immediately improves the factor 1/4 in the exponent in Equation (14) to an exponent of 1/3 (details omitted).
DEEP-FRI
We now describe our variation of FRI, that we call DEEP-FRI, for which we can give improved soundness guarantees, at the cost of a small increase in the query complexity (but no increase in the proof length or the number of queries to committed proofs -which is important in applications). Before we can describe our protocol we introduce the operation of "quotienting", which allows us to focus our attention on polynomials taking certain values at certain points.
Quotienting
Suppose we a set L ⊆ F q and a function f : L → F q . Suppose further that we are given a point z ∈ F q and a value b ∈ F q .
We define the function
Then we define QUOTIENT(f, z, b) to be the function g : L → F q given by:
. Then the following are equivalent:
• There exists a polynomial
Proof. If there is such a polynomial Q, deg(Q) ≤ d − 1 that agrees with g on all but a δ-fraction of entries, we can take
Conversely, if there is such a polynomial R that agrees with f on all but a δ-fraction of entries, we can take Q = (R − b)/Z. This is indeed a polynomial because R − b vanishes on z, so Z|(R − b) in the ring of polynomials.
Finally, by construction R agrees with f whenever g agrees with R and this completes the proof.
DEEP-FRI
For this, it will be helpful to keep in mind the case that the domain L (0) is much smaller than the field F q (maybe q = |L (0) | Θ(1) ).
Protocol 5.4 (DEEP-FRI).
Input: a function f (0) : L (0) → F q which is supposed to be of degree < d (0) .
(a) The verifier picks a uniformly random z (i) ∈ F q .
(b) The prover writes down a degree one polynomial B (i)
(which is supposed to be such that B 
(which on input y is supposed to equal QUOTIENT(H
The prover writes down a value C ∈ F q . QUERY Phase:
(a) The verifier picks a uniformly random
2. ACCEPT.
Analysis
The following theorem proves the soundness of the DEEP-FRI protocol.
Theorem 5.5 (DEEP-FRI). Fix degree bound d
For some ǫ, δ > 0, let
Then the following properties hold when the DEEP-FRI protocol is invoked on oracle
f (0) : L (0) → F q ,
Prover complexity is O(n) arithmetic operations over F

Verifier complexity is O(log n) arithmetic operations over F for a single invocation of the QUERY phase; this also bounds communication and query complexity (measured in field elements).
3. Completeness If f (0) ∈ RS (0) and f (1) , . . . , f (r) are computed by the prover specified in the COMMIT phase, then the DEEP-FRI verifier outputs accept with probability 1.
Soundness Suppose
Then with all but probability
and for any (adaptively chosen) prover oracles f (1) , . . . , f (r) , the QUERY protocol with repetition parameter ℓ outputs accept with probability at most
Consequently, the soundness error of FRI is at most
We give a consequence below with a specific setting of parameters based on the Johnson bound.
Example 5.6. Continuing with the notation of Theorem 5.5, fix degree bound
Then with all but probability err COMMIT ≤ O(q −Ω(1) ), the query phase will accept with probability at most:
, and apply the previous theorem. Theorem 2.2 implies that L * < q 1/13 /(2 √ ρ) = O(q 1/13 ). Set ǫ = q −6/13 . Hence
which implies err COMMIT ≤Õ(q −1/13 ). If δ = δ (0) , then 1 − δ * + (log n)ǫ = 1 − δ + o(1). Otherwise δ = 1 − √ ρ − q −1/13 , and so
We now give an example setting of DEEP-FRI under the optimistic Conjecture 2.3.
Example 5.7. Assume Conjecture 2.3. Continuing with the notation of Theorem 5.5, fix degree bound
. Conjecture 2.3 gives us:
We then apply the previous theorem. We get
) ≪ q −1/12 , and this gives us the claimed bound on err COMMIT .
For the bound on err QUERY , we note that δ = δ (0) + o(1). This is because every function is within distance 1 − ρ of RS (0) (this follows easily from polynomial interpolation). Thus
and we get the desired bound on err COMMIT .
The prover and verifier complexity as well as completeness follow by construction (see, e.g., [BBHR18b] for detailed analysis of these aspects). In the rest of the section we prove the soundness bound of Theorem 5.5.
Preparations
We do the analysis below for the case ℓ = 1. The generalization to arbitrary ℓ easily follows.
Define
In the case of the honest prover (when f (0) ∈ RS (0) ), we will have
for all i. Our analysis of the above protocol will track the agreement of f (i) with RS (i) . This agreement will be measured in a certain weighted way, which we define next.
The success probability at s ∈ L (i)
There is a natural directed forest that one can draw on the vertex set
namely, where s ∈ L (i) is joined to q (i) (s) ∈ L (i+1) (and we say that s is a child of q (i) (s)). Note that every vertex not in L (0) has two children. Let i ≤ r − 1 and s 0 ∈ L (i) . Let s ∈ L (i+1) be the parent of s 0 , and let s 1 ∈ L (i) the sibling of s 0 . We color s 0 GREEN if f (i+1) (s) is consistent with f (i) | {s 0 ,s 1 } according to the test
and we color s 0 RED otherwise. Notice that a vertex and its sibling get the same color. For s ∈ L (r) , we color s GREEN if f (r) (s) = C and RED otherwise. The QUERY phase of the protocol can be summarized as follows: we pick a uniformly random s (0) ∈ L (0) and consider the path s (0) , s (1) , s (2) . . . , s (r) going through all its ancestors. If all these vertices are GREEN, then we ACCEPT, otherwise we REJECT.
To capture this, we define functions
be the fraction of leaf-descendants s (0) of s for which the path from s (0) to s (including s (0) but not including s) consists exclusively of GREEN vertices. Observe that p ACCEP T = E s∈L (r) [η (r) (s) · 1 f (r) (s)=C ] equals the probability that the QUERY phase accepts.
The exact quantity that we will track is as i increases is the weighted agreement:
Notice that
and the acceptance probability, p ACCEP T satisfies:
Our main intermediate claim is that with high probability over the choice of
z (i) , we have that α (i+1) is not much more than α (i) . This gives us that p ACCEP T is not much more than 1 − ∆(f (0) , RS (0) ), as desired.
Operations AVG and ZERO
We define two important operations.
1. AVG. For a function w :
, and let {s 0 , s 1 } = (q (i−1) ) −1 (s). Then define:
, we set:
We can use these two operations to express η (i+1) in terms of η (i) . Let E (i+1) denote the set of all s ∈ S (i+1) both of whose children are RED (i.e., the test
Then we have:
Analogous to our definition of
we define
The following two lemmas control the growth of α (i) and β (i) .
Lemma 5.8. For all i, with probability at least 1 − ν * over the choice of x (i) , z (i) , we have:
We prove this using Theorem 4.3 in Appendix C.
Lemma 5.9. For all i,
We prove this using Lemma 5.3 in Appendix C. We can now complete the proof of Theorem 5.5.
Proof. As observed earlier, α (0) = 1 − ∆(f (0) , RS (0) ) < 1 − δ. The two lemmas above imply that with probability at least 1 − rν * ,
Finally, we use the observation that p ACCEP T ≤ α (r) to complete the proof.
The DEEP Algebraic Linking IOP (DEEP-ALI) protocol
The techniques used earlier in Theorem 4.1 and Section 5 can also be used to improve soundness in other parts of an interactive oracle proof (IOP) protocol. We apply them here to obtain a Scalable Transparent IOP of Knowledge (STIK) [BBHR18a, Definition 3.3] with better soundness than the prior state of the art, given in [BBHR18a, Theorem 3.4]. Proof systems typically use a few steps of reduction to convert problems of membership in a nondeterministic language L to algebraic problems regarding proximity of a function (or a sequence of functions) to an algebraic code like Reed-Solomon (or, in earlier works, Reed-Muller). The goal of such a reduction is to maintain a large proximity gap γ, meaning that for instances in L, an honest prover will provide information that leads to codewords, whereas for instances not in L, any oracles submitted by the prover will be converted by the reduction, with high probability, to functions that are γ-far from the code. Considerable effort is devoted to increasing γ because it is the input to the proximity protocols (like FRI and DEEP-FRI) and the soundness of those protocols is correlated to γ (as discussed earlier, e.g., in Theorem 5.5).
The STIK protocol is a special case of this paradigm. It requires the prover to provide oracle access to a function f : D → F that is supposedly an RS encoding of a witness for membership of the input instance in L. A set of t-local constraints is applied to f to construct a function g : D → F, along with a gap-gurantee: If f is indeed an encoding of a valid witness for the instance, then the resulting function g : D → F is also be a member of an RS code. One of the tests that the verifier performs is a consistency test between f and g, and, prior to this work, this consistency test was applied to the functions f and g directly. This leads to a rather small gap γ ≤ 1 8 which results in a small soundness guarantee from the RPT protocol applied to f, g later on.
In this section we apply the DEEP technique to this setting. After f and g have been provided, the verifier samples a random z ∈ F q and asks for the values of the interpolating polynomials of f, g on all t entries needed to check the consistency test. Our verifier now applies the QUOTIENT operation to f, g, using the information obtained from the prover. Crucially, we prove that a single consistency test, conducted over a large domain D ′ ⊃ D, suffices to improve the proximity gap to roughly 1 − √ ρ, a value that approaches 1 as ρ → 0. Assuming Conjecture 2.3 the proximity gap is nearly-optimal, at γ ≈ 1 − ρ (compare with with the value γ ≤ 1/8 obtained by prior works). Details follow.
We focus on the the Algebraic linking IOP protocol (ALI) of [BBHR18a, Theorem B.15 ], and present a new protocol that we call DEEP-ALI (Protocol 6.4) that obtains the aforementioned improved proximity gap(s).
In what follows, we will first recall (a variant of) the language (or, more accurately, binary relation) which was the input to the ALI protocol of [BBHR18a] and is likewise the input to our DEEP-ALI protocol. The description of the protocol follows in Section 6.2. Its basic properties are specified in Section 6.3 and we analyze its soundness in Theorem 6.2 and Section 6.4.
The Algebraic Placement and Routing (APR) Relation
In what follows we use the notationf to refer to a polynomial in F [x] . Note that the operator | D for D ⊆ F takes a polynomial to a function:
We start by defining a simplified version of the Algebraic placement and routing relation (APR). See [BBHR18a, Definition B.10]. In particular, we only use one witness polynomial. This relation will be the input to the reduction used in Protocol 6.4. • F q is a finite field of size q.
• d is an integer representing a bound on the degree of the witness.
• C is a set of |C| tuples (M i , P i , Q i ) representing constraints. M i is the mask which is a sequence of field elements
is the condition of the constraint which is a polynomial with
is the domain polynomial of the constraint which should vanish on the locations where the constraint should hold.
We further introduce the following notation:
• Let d C = max i deg(P i ) be the maximal total degree of the P i s.
• Let Q lcm ∈ F q [x] be the least common multiple of the Q i s.
Witness format: The witness Û is a polynomialf
We say thatf satisfies the constraint if the constraint holds at every x ∈ F q for which Q(x) = 0.
We say that Û satisfies the instance if and only if deg(f ) < d andf satisfies all of the constraints.
To see that the notion of the R APR relation defined above is strong enough, we follow the ideas from [BBHR18a] 
The DEEP-ALI protocol
We now describe our new protocol, that achieves improved soundness, as stated in the following theorem. 
)/q approaches 0 as q → ∞. Moreover, Example 5.6 implies that ǫ, ǫ ′ approach ρ ℓ/2 .
We now describe the protocol that achieves the soundness of Theorem 6.2.
Protocol 6.4 (DEEP-ALI).
1. The prover sends an oracle f : D → F (which should bef | D ).
The verifier sends random coefficients
3. The prover sends an oracle g α :
4. The verifier sends a random value z ∈ F q .
Denote
The prover sends a α,z : M z → F (which should bef | Mz ). The verifier deduces b α,z , the alleged value ofg α (z), using Equation (16).
6. Let U (x), Z(x) as defined in Section 5.2.1 for QUOTIENT(f, a α,z ) and let
and note that the verifier has oracle access to h 1 and h 2 using the oracles f and g α .
They use RPT D and RPT
(in other words, it is close to a polynomial of degree < d − |M|) and that h 2 is at most δ-far
Properties of DEEP-ALI
Note that in the original ALI protocol, the equivalent to the expression
is sampled at Q random locations from the evaluation domain, where Q is the number of queries.
The main idea in DEEP-ALI is to use Quotienting to allow the verifier to choose one random element z from the entire field, and check the consistency betweenf andg only at x = z.
The fact that DEEP-ALI allows to sample from the entire field introduces several advantages over the ALI protocol from [BBHR18a]:
Soundness As described above, the reduction in ALI has lower bound 1/8 on the distance from the code for inputs that are not in the language, even for ρ → 0. In DEEP-ALI the lower bound on the distance is 1 − √ ρ.
Query complexity In ALI the verifier queries |M| · Q field elements as we need |M| elements to evaluate
). In DEEP-ALI the verifier queries O(|M| + Q) field elements as the evaluation of P i is done once.
Verifier complexity Previously, the verifier complexity was Ω(Q·T arith ) (where T arith is the arithmetic complexity of evaluating all the constraints). The verifier complexity in DEEP-ALI depends on Q + T arith as we evaluate the constraints only once.
Prover complexity It is possible to alter Definition 6.1 and DEEP-ALI to work with several witness polynomials f 1 , . . . , f w (as was done in ALI). The prover complexity in this case will depend on (wρ
Soundness analysis
The proof of Theorem 6.2 will follow from the following lemma:
Lemma 6.5. Let E be the event that the DEEP-ALI verifier accepts. If
then there exists a polynomial of degree < d satisfying the constraints.
Let E 1 be the event where the verifier accepts and h 1 and h 2 are at most δ-far from the corresponding codes.
} < δ|D|.
Similarly there exists a polynomialh 2 =h 2 α,z of degree
Fixr 1 (x) (independent of α and z) to be the element in L(f ) maximizing the probability that
Fixr 2 α (x) ∈ L(g α ) maximizing the probability thatr 2 α (x) = (x − z)h 2 (x) + b given E 2 (note thatr 2 α depends on α as the oracle g α was sent only after the verifier sent α), and let E 3 ⊆ E 2 be the event wherer 2
The event E 3 impliesr
Recall that b α,z was defined according to (16), so
.
Substituting values for a α,z and b α,z and multiplying by Q lcm (z) we obtain:
Both sides of the equation are polynomials of degree Note that the set of α's satisfying this event forms a vector space. If its dimension was less than |C| then the probability would have been ≤ 1/q. Hence this event holds for every α. Substituting the elements of the standard basis, we get that for every 1 ≤ i ≤ |C|,
is divisible by Q lcm (x).
Substituting any x for which Q i (x) = 0 gives P i (r 1 (x · M i 1 ), . . . ,r 1 (x · M i |M i | )) = 0 which implies thatr 1 satisfies all the constraints, as required.
Further optimizations for practical implementation
As we saw, it makes sense to work with several witness polynomials rather than one, as it improves the prover complexity. Another optimization is to apply the RPT only once for both h 1 and h 2 by taking a random linear combination of the two (and using Theorem 4.1). To make this work, the prover writes the degree < d · d C polynomialg(x) as: and notice |A| ≥ ηq/2. For x ∈ F q , pick v x ∈ V to be a member of List(u x , V, δ) that maximizes Pr z∈S [P (z) = B z (x)]. Let S x = {z ∈ S | v x , z = B z (x)} and set µ x = |S x |/s. By definition, |List(u x , V, δ)| ≤ L * δ , and so by the pigeonhole principle, for each x ∈ A we have µ x ≥ η 2L * δ . For x, β, γ picked uniformly from A we have
Thus Pr Consider some γ where this happens. LetS = S x 0 ∩ S β 0 ∩ S γ . Extend each of u * , u to functions over domain S by defining for all z ∈ S \ [n] u * (z) = B z (0) and u(z) = B z (1), and for x ∈ F q let u x (z) = u * (z) + xu(z). Since V is systematic, we define v x (z) = v x | [k] , z and thus extend v x to domainS. By construction we know (x 0 , u x 0 ), (β 0 , u β 0 ), (γ, u γ ) are collinear. So, in particular, (x 0 , u x 0 |S), (β 0 , u β 0 |S), (γ, u γ |S) ∈ F q × FS q are likewise collinear, as a special case. By definition ofS, we get that: (x 0 , v x 0 |S), (β 0 , v β 0 |S), (γ, v γ |S) ∈ F q × FS q are also collinear. Since |S| > σ and S is σ-robust we conclude that v γ is uniquely determined by v γ |S . This allows us to conclude that (x 0 , v x 0 ), (β 0 , v β 0 ), (γ, v γ ) ∈ F q × F n q are all collinear, recalling that v x 0 ∈ List(u x 0 , V, δ).
Thus, an ǫ/2-fraction of the γ ∈ A have the "good" property that (γ, v γ ) is on the line passing through (x 0 , v x 0 ) and (β 0 , v β 0 ). Write this line as v * + xv and notice that for all "good" γ we have v γ = v * + γv. Let A ′ ⊆ A denote the set of good elements for this line, recording that |A ′ | ≥ |A| · ǫ/2 ≥ 1/ǫ. By definition of List(u x , V, δ) and the assumption v x ∈ List(u x , V, δ), we have that ∆(u x , v x ) < δ for x ∈ A ′ .
Consider the set C ⊂ [n] defined by C = {y ∈ [n] | u * (y) = v * (y) AND u(y) = v(y)} .
For each y ∈ [n] \ C there exists at most a single value of x ∈ F q satisfying u x (y) = v x (y) because u x (y) − v x (y) = (u * (y) − v * (y)) + x · (u(y) − v(y))
Rearranging, we get |C| n ≥ 1 − (δ + ǫ) and this completes the proof.
B The algebraic hash function
We now describe the algebraic hash function H x . The description of the hash function requires fixing some choices of certain subspaces. For each i ∈ [0, r] we choose F 2 -subspaces L . Given x ∈ F and f : L (i) → F, the hash of f with seed x is defined to be the function H x [f ] : L (i+1) → F as follows. For s ∈ L (i+1) , let s 0 , s 1 ∈ L (i) be the two roots of q (i) (X) − s. Let P f,s (X) ∈ F[X] be the unique degree ≤ 1 polynomial satisfying P f,s (s 0 ) = f (s 0 ), P f,s (s 1 ) = f (s 1 ).
Then we define
LetP (X, Y ) P * (Y ) + X · P (Y ) and notice that deg X (P ) ≤ 1, deg Y (P ) ≤ d (i+1) . Consider the polynomial R(X) P (X, q (i) (X)). We have
We claim that R agrees with f onT = s∈T S
s . Take any s ∈ T and let S (i) s = {s 0 , s 1 } ∈ S (i) be the pair of roots of the polynomial q (i) (X) − s. First we show that the polynomials P f,s (X) andP (X, s) are identical. Indeed,P (X, s)) = P * (s) + XP (s) = u * (s) + Xu(s) = P f,s (X). It follows that f (s 0 ) =P (s 0 , s) =P s 0 , q (i) (s 0 ) = R (s 0 )
